Third, foreign military forces conduct both military and civilian missions, especially in the areas of humanitarian relief; search and rescue; protecting, evacuating, and escorting nationals; peacekeeping; and conflict prevention—all of which fall under the category of “soft use of hard power.” Fourth, the soft approach to overseas military activity is mission-oriented and characterized by temporary deployment, which boasts greater flexibility and a lower economic cost. China’s increased military presence in the Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise. Geoeconomic strategy has remained the cornerstone of China’s diplomacy. The Chinese economy is highly reliant on trade routes that pass through the Indian Ocean, which serves as a vital pathway, particularly for energy supplies. The Middle East is already China’s largest market, accounting for $10 billion in arms sales between 2013 and 2017. As of 2017, more than 75 percent of the people here were still living in poverty. First, the foreign country does not have extraterritorial privileges since no military base means no “state within a state” or “special military zone.” Second, the foreign country does not seek to institutionalize its military arrangements with the host country. ... the largest tri-service weapons expo in the Middle East. Third, China’s soft military presence in the Middle East will continue to follow traditional Chinese diplomatic principles that reject overseas military deployments, hegemony, and power politics. The Chinese People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti is a military base operated by the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), located in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.It is the PLAN's first overseas military base and was built at a cost of US$590 million. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. Regardless, Chinese supply lines from the Middle East would likely be under severe threat in a major contingency and its forces in the Indian Ocean would be isolated. Although it might be possible to convoy forces, these convoys would probably have to avoid the Malacca Strait. Although Chinese diplomatic principles reject the “spheres of influence” mentality, they do not forbid temporary military deployment when Chinese interests are threatened. By deploying a “soft” military presence overseas, specifically in the Middle East, China can protect its commercial interests while also providing public goods for the international community and minimizing the risk of damage to multilateral relations. While military bases enhance the overall deterrence capability of the host nations in which they are located, they can also create friction between the foreign and host nations, as well as incur high economic costs. CSIS Briefs is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. On Monday, the commander of US military forces in the Middle East, Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, signaled that Iran's activities remain the United States' greatest concern in the region. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities. Russia seeks to be able to effectively influence and shape outcomes, but a lack of means limits what it can achieve. China has repeatedly complained about US Navy ships getting close to islands it occupies in the South China Sea, where Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan all … China’s military presence overseas has taken three main forms. [1] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Pushes ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in South, Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/. These exchanges have laid a foundation for further military cooperation in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. It can also entail building overseas munitions warehouses, joint intelligence facilities, aerospace tracking facilities, earthquake monitoring stations, technical service and military replenishment stops, maintenance bases, and military teaching institutions. China’s new military base in Djibouti provides a rudimentary power-projection base, which is bolstered by its access to ports in Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. China claims it is for space exploration and intelligence services. Although China’s sea power is facing a challenge in the western Pacific, it has not stopped China from rising peacefully. In contrast, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa are marginalized. This is not a direct confrontation of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In a sign of the growing confidence of the Chinese military, Admiral Yin Zhuo said that the country may set … Saudi Arabia. [7] Thomas P.M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map (New York: Putnam, 2004). Conclusion. To sustain military forces in the Indian Ocean region, China needs to have reliable access to facilities in key points around the region. These forces would be less vulnerable to attack than large surface ships. From Rabat to Riyadh, US allies (and adversaries) across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have witnessed rapid growth in economic, commercial, and diplomatic ties with China. By increasing the well-being of the Chinese people and developing the domestic economy, China seeks to maintain stability and reshape the world economic order. Chinese vessels may also conduct some more specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to better understand regional militaries and gather data on the geographic area in and around the Indian Ocean. Military exchanges have also increased between China and Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sudan, the Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, and others. Second, the Chinese convoy fleet in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters will play a “bridgehead” role in case of a natural disaster or other emergency requiring relief or evacuation. Such efforts could serve as a response to Indian efforts to build maritime capacity in Southeast Asia with states such as Vietnam. Although China is using its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to fund many of these projects, there is no question that the infrastructure is being created with dual-use purposes in mind. The expansion of China’s soft military presence overseas is also technically feasible. [5] There are 3,000 Chinese enterprises and representative offices and a total of 200,000 Chinese expatriates in Dubai, making it the largest expatriate Chinese community. Zack Cooper is senior fellow for Asian security at CSIS. Australian military ships and aircraft will continue to patrol the South China Sea amid warnings from China that a declaration of independence by Taiwan would “mean war”. Oman Library at the Middle East Institute, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-06/16/content_624310.htm, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/chinas-naval-diplomacy-plan-ships-visit-german-port-of-hamburg/, http://english.cri.cn/12394/2014/12/02/191s854861.htm, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, http://www.mei.edu/content/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-economic-relations, What will the Middle East look like in 2030? This would also serve to expand the number of concerns for the Indian military, potentially stretching the Indian Navy. In contrast, China, India, and South Korea have made it their primary objective to address domestic problems, caused primarily by overpopulation and resource scarcity. It seeks to resolve problems through short-term assignments. China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad. The term “string of pearls” was first used to refer to Chinese basing access in the Indian Ocean by a 2004 report for the U.S. Department of Defense. Thus, the security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. Therefore, if a conflict were severe enough that the United States or India were attempting to cut energy supplies to China, then Beijing would likely be forced to rely on its continental supply routes and its reserves for the duration of a conflict. The PLA would find it exceedingly difficult to protect its trade routes, bases, and ships if a contingency were to occur involving either India or the United States (or potentially both at once). CSIS does not take specific policy positions. In the twenty-first century, the United States, Europe, and Japan have formed the “traditional core area,” while China, India, and Brazil have forged a “new core area.”[7] These two core regions have a higher degree of globalization and human development. The carrier also provides technical support for Chinese forces needing to dock temporarily between domestic bases and overseas stations. Protection of trade routes is likely to be the primary objective, but it will require substantial improvements in the PLA Navy’s ability to sustain forces at sea. “Civilianizing” the State in the MENA and Asia Pacific Regions, Monday Briefing: Iran and Israel come to blows, Trump’s new arms-sales policy is good but sounds awful, China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East. In the years ahead, it would not be surprising to see the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) develop some rudimentary facilities in the region for conducting at least minor repairs. Read more ... As a result of the growth of its comprehensive power, China today has two frontiers. In the near term, China will likely continue to conduct counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa. • Argentina – A base in the province of Neuquén in Patagonia. Land loaned to the Chinese government during Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s presidency. With the acceleration of its military modernization, China is now able to project its power overseas. Just as the United States is vulnerable in East Asia because it relies on a few bases in the Pacific to project power, China would be vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. The United States, Britain, and France rely primarily on military bases to protect their geopolitical interests in the Middle East. This may be useful both from an intelligence-gathering perspective and for helping the PLA to compare its strengths and weaknesses to those of foreign militaries, including the United States, India, Japan, Australia, and others. Chinese trade routes would be particularly vulnerable because the sea lines of communication from the Middle East to China run near the Indian coast for much of their journey. This serves multiple purposes. How might China use these facilities in peacetime? Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). Only in two years, however, all people in Shawa Village shook off extreme poverty with the help of Yunnan Provincial Military Area Command. China may also seek to conduct training and exercises in the region, potentially in partnership with other militaries. Second, the foreign nation has the right to access and use the bases freely while enjoying extraterritorial rights and privileges. This essay is part of the series “All About China”—a journey into the history and diverse culture of China through essays that shed light on the lasting imprint of China’s past encounters with the Islamic world as well as an exploration of the increasingly vibrant and complex dynamics of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern relations. The most sweeping transformation in decades will shift the focus from fighting insurgents in the Middle East to preparing for conflict in western Pacific. As a result, it is unlikely that China would risk operating a carrier strike group in the Indian Ocean in a contingency. Managing China’s rise has become the paramount US foreign policy issue. ... “Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military … Their military presence ranks second to that of the United States. Others suggest that the Chinese government is simply following its expanding trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. Some have warned that China might be able to sustain a carrier strike group in the region, which would certainly provide a substantial power-projection capability in a crisis. Beijing: China on Thursday said the disengagement process of the Chinese and Indian frontline troops at the eastern Ladakh border was progressing smoothly and … Although Beijing is unlikely to find any highly capable partners in the region, it could work with less capable maritime states, such as Pakistan, to help them develop their maritime capabilities. China’s efforts to project power in the Indian Ocean are nascent, but their outlines are becoming clear. In Dubai, the China-Middle East Investment and Trade Promotion Center covers an area of 150,000 square meters. Britain and France have built military bases and deployed about 3,000 personnel in Cyprus, the UAE, and Djibouti. Its military influence is unparalleled. All rights reserved. Middle East states use Russia as an alternative and a signal to the West. Mapping undersea features would be particularly beneficial in preparing for a potential wartime scenario. [5] Naser M. Al-Tamimi, China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990-2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic Alliance? [6] For example, see Dania Thafer, “After the Financial Crisis: China-Dubai Economic Relations,” Middle East-Asia Project (MAP), September 15, 2013, http://www.mei.edu/content/after-financial-crisis-dubai-china-economic-relations. A softer military presence differs from the more permanent presence of a military base in a few fundamental ways. China has exported 16.2 billion units of ammunition — mostly to countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa — over the past 12 years, according to SIPRI data. That could lead to significant shifts in the U.S. military “footprint” in the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, although such changes have been tried before with limited success. The Western definition of a national interest is usually anchored in concerns about threats to national security (e.g., terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the possibility of other great powers seeking political and military dominance in the Middle East). In Saudi Arabia, 70 Chinese-funded enterprises currently employ 16,000 Chinese workers. © 2018 Middle East Institute All Rights Reserved | Accessibility Policy | Built by Social Driver. At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. Sign up to receive the latest publications, event invitations, and our weekly newsletter delivered to your inbox. Middle East Institute © 2018 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is natural, therefore, for the Chinese government to seek to protect its interests along these sea lines of communication. Second, counter-piracy provides a window into the operational patterns of foreign militaries. Middle East; China; Defense head Austin weighs warship needs in Pacific, Mideast ... for American warships around the globe as he wrestles with security threats from China in the Pacific and Iran in the Middle East. Defense Industry, Acquisition, and Innovation, Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Energy, Climate Change, and Environmental Impacts, Family Planning, Maternal and Child Health, and Immunizations, Download PDF file of "Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean". At present, the United States has deployed approximately 50,000 personnel and established military bases in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Turkey, Djibouti, and Afghanistan. Russia is making a concerted effort to reclaim its role as the arms supplier of choice for Arab governments. Sign up to receive The Evening, a daily brief on the news, events, and people shaping the world of international affairs. That report suggested China’s growing regional presence could “deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Other scholars have warned that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Regardless, Chinese supply lines from the Middle East would likely be under severe threat in a major contingency and its forces in the Indian Ocean would be isolated. The most likely Chinese strategy would be to rely on port facilities to refuel and resupply its naval vessels without having to come back to Chinese facilities in East Asia. China’s activities in the Indian Ocean have attracted a great deal of interest in recent years. It has also built interim technical service stops in Djibouti, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. A growing soft military presence in the region will enable China not only to protect its own interests but also to participate in regional governance and develop a new model for great power relations. Defence officials are concerned about China’s “desire to erode US military advantages” in the Middle East, Michael Mulroy, the top Pentagon official for the region, told the Financial Times. [2] Both the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative and the 1+2+3 strategy stem primarily from geoeconomic—not geopolitical—considerations. He cited Chinese desires to establish military bases in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Western Pacific. These interactions have created ideal conditions for developing the Chinese military presence overseas. International Status-Seeking China has … Meanwhile, China — considered by many to be the greatest competitor and threat to the U.S. — has only one official overseas base, in Djibouti, a country in eastern Africa. China, India, and South Korea rely on temporary military exchanges to protect geoeconomic interests. First, it gives Chinese forces practice conducting difficult operations at a great distance from the mainland. It maintains up to 5,000 km of maritime trade and safeguards transport lines and investment projects from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf. While peacetime operations in the Indian Ocean provide many opportunities for the PLA to expand its reach and capabilities, any substantial Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean would be highly vulnerable in wartime. Chinese military contractors have already started to sell dangerous, autonomous killer robots to customers in the Middle East. How might China use its forces in peacetime? An Israeli Perspective. Active personnel: 227,000. What PLA forces would this leave in the Indian Ocean region? [4] United Nations Peacekeeping, “Contributions by Country,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml. The hard approach includes several key elements.
Kenmore Washer And Dryer Combo Troubleshooting, Fdny Lieutenant Promotion List 2020, How Do I Reinstate My Suspended License In Ga, Eso Psijic Portals, Harley Davidson Exhaust Bolt Torque, Mr Untouchable Movie, Bell Huey Rc Helicopter, Movies About The End Of The World,